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OF 
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UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD CO., 
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STERLING H. NELSON & SONS, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
d/b/a MURRAY ELEVATORS, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 14,343 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Plaintiff-respondent Union Pacific Railroad brought 
an action against defendant-appellant Murray Elevators alleging 
that Murray Elevators owed extra freight charges on eight rail 
shipments of fish food to the Canadian government in Nova Scotia. 
Murray Elevators answered and counterclaimed that any alleged 
extra charges were uncollectable because of Union Pacific's 
negligence in ascertaining and quoting the wrong freight rates 
to Murray Elevators and in late billing of the alleged additional 
charges therefor. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted Union Pacific's Motion for 
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Summary Judgment on the ground that under prior ICC case law 
Murray Elevators was not entitled to assert any negligence of 
Union Pacific as either a defense or counterclaim. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Murray Elevators asks this Court to determine that 
the right to assert the negligence of Union Pacific under the 
circumstances of this case is a fundamental right and that 
denial thereof is a violation of Murray Elevators' right to 
due process of law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts are divided into numbered para-
graphs for convenience. 
1. For a number of years prior to April, 1970, 
S. H. Nelson & Sons, Inc., a Utah family corporation d/b/a 
Murray Elevators was engaged in the manufacture of fish food 
and usually shipped the same via railroad common carrier to 
destination points both within and without the United States. 
2. On occasion Murray Elevators was invited to make 
bids for the sale of fish food to the Canadian government. 
(R. 42, Affidavit of C. Nelson). 
3. Prior to making the bids to the Canadian govern-
ment for the shipments involved in this action, Murray Elevators 
contacted Union Pacific and asked Union Pacific to ascertain 
and quote exact shipping rates and categories to Murray Elevators 
who had to rely thereon because it could not collect additional Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-3-
charges thereafter from the Canadian government. (R. 42, 
Affidavit). 
4. The reason for asking Union Pacific to quote the 
correct freight rates and categories was that even with the 
assistance of Union Pacific personnel, Murray Elevators was 
unable to determine the appropriate category and rate for the 
shipments because of the complexity of the rate books and 
therefore was dependent on the proper selection by Union 
Pacific. (R. 92, Answers to Interrogatories). 
5. At that time pursuant to the above request/ 
Union Pacific ascertained and furnished Murray Elevators with 
the rates and categories used in the bids. (R. 42, Affidavit). 
6. Murray Elevators obtained said bids and shipped 
fish food in accordance with said bid quotes to Canada for the 
Canadian government via Union Pacific and paid Union Pacific 
the original rates billed by Union Pacific. (R. 54, Defendant's 
Memorandum). 
7. More than a year after said shipments Union 
Pacific sent Murray Elevators bills for approximately $2,000 
of alleged additional freight charges on 8 shipments to 
Canada because the original rate quoted by Union Pacific had 
been determined by Union Pacific to be incorrect. (R. 43, 44, 
Affidavit). 
8. Murray Elevators was unable to obtain reimburse-
ment from the Canadian government for the additional freight 
allegedly owed. (R. 43, Affidavit). 
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9. Since the bids were given, several different 
rates have been alleged by Union Pacific to be the correct 
rates and the correct rates on several shipments are still 
in doubt. (R. 89). 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT I. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF 
THIS CASE, IT IS A DENIAL OF MURRAY ELEVATORS1 
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW TO PROHIBIT 
MURRAY ELEVATORS FROM ASSERTING A DEFENSE OR 
COUNTERCLAIM BASED ON UNION PACIFIC'S 
NEGLIGENCE. 
The issues in this case are whether a shipper should 
be allowed to assert the negligence of a carrier as a 
defense or counterclaim and whether payment of lower rates 
under the circumstances of this case amounts to a prohibited 
secret rebate. 
The history of not allowing the assertion of a 
carrier's negligence by a shipper goes back to the late 1800's 
with the interpretation of the original Interstate Commerce 
Act which prohibited secret rebates. It is interesting that 
the language of the Act itself does not disallow the assertion 
of a carrier's negligence. The prohibition was one originally 
imposed by the courts because of flagrant attempts to evade the 
Act by monopolistic businesses colluding with the carriers. One 
of the most egregious examples of such collusion is contained 
in Handy, et al., Trustees v. Cleveland & M.R. Company, 31 Fed. 
689 (S. Dist. Ohio, 1887), wherein Standard Oil Company had 
been granted a preferential rate by the involved railroad of 
$.10 per barrel of oil shipped. Standard's competitors were 
charged $.35 per barrel with the railroad rebating the extra Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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All unjust discriminations are in 
violation of sound public policy and are 
forbidden by law. We have had frequent 
occasions to enunciate this doctrine in 
the past few years. If it were not so 
the managers of railways in collusion with 
others in command of large capital could 
control the business of the country at 
least to the extent that business was 
dependent upon railroad transportation for 
its success; and make and unmake the 
fortunes of men at will. The idea is justly 
abhorrent to all fair minds. No such 
dangerous powers can be tolerated. 
It is understandable that under the circumstances of 
the Handy case, the courts would make sweeping and general 
statements to prohibit the practice of secret rebates occurring 
because of collusion between the large monopolistic shippers 
and carriers. Professor Isaac B. Lake discussed the problem 
in Discrimination by Railroads and Other Public Utilities, 
104-5 (1947): 
The evil sought to be eradicated by this 
section [Interstate Commerce Act, 6(7), 49 
U.S.C. §6(7)] was the giving of secret rebates 
on the basis of personal favoritism with the 
sinister purpose of enabling the favored patron 
to gain an advantage over his rivals. That is, it 
struck at the practice which was the chief 
reason for governmental interference with utility 
rates. However, the Section is so sweeping as 
to forbid any departure from the published tariff, 
however harmless and however innocent in motive. 
It is under this section that the carrier can sue 
for undercharges made accidentally and is absolved 
from contracts to give special services. The 
courts have been obligated by its terms to 
render judgments in favor of the carriers which 
were grossly unjust to the recipient of such 
casual and harmless preferences. The section 
appears to be too sweeping in its condemnation. 
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Here the passion for equality has lead to 
unnecessary injustices and irritating 
interferences with liberty. 
As time passed the courts applied the earlier sweeping pro-
hibition mechanically and did not look for collusion but 
simply applied the proscription without analysis. The rule 
was carried to the extreme in Louisville & N.R. Co. v. 
Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94, 97 (1915), wherein the United States 
Supreme Court stated that: 
Ignorance or misquotation of rates is 
not an excuse for paying or charging either 
less or more than the rate set. This rule 
is undeniably strict, and it obviously may 
work hardship in some cases, but it embodies 
the policy which has been adopted by Congress 
in the regulation of the interstate commerce 
in order to prevent unjust discrimination. 
As understandable as such application might have 
been in the late 1800's or early part of this century it makes 
no sense to apply it unthinkingly in light of today's economy 
and especially under the circumstances of this case. It is 
clear that the judge-made rule of the 1800's suffers from 
old age when applied in the 1970's. In this case there can 
be no collusion. Union Pacific is publicly willing to rely 
on the old case rule and Murray Elevators is publicly willing 
to defend itself. Thus there can be no collusion between the 
two and if collusion is wanting the doctrine of secret rebates 
as a result of collusion is simply inapplicable and the old 
cases should not apply to this action. The rule was employed 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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to combat discrimination against small shippers. To apply 
the rule in this case results in the exact discrimination 
that was sought to be prevented by the rule. 
In the instant case the reason for asking Union 
Pacific to quote the applicable category and rate for each 
of the shipments was because principals of Murray Elevators 
had attempted to determine the appropriate rates but could 
not ascertain the same because of the complicated and confusing 
rate books maintained by Union Pacific. Accordingly, Murray 
Elevators relied on Union Pacific to furnish the rates and 
categories. In exercising its judgment Union Pacific was 
aware that Murray Elevators could not recover any additional 
freight charges from the Canadian government. 
Under such circumstances it is clear that recovery 
of damages for negligence against Union Pacific in misquoting 
rates is not an unlawful rebate within the scope of the ICC 
legislation. Certainly the openness of the litigation process 
is an effective check against secret rebates. In the words of 
Mr. Justice Brandeis, "sunlight is said to be the best of dis-
infectants; electric light to be the most efficient policeman." 
Cited in K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, Section 4.18 
(1970 Supp.) 
To prevent a defense or cause of action for negligence 
against the railroad in this case would be to foster the unfair-
ness which the law avowedly attempted to eliminate. 
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In recent years the courts have taken a much more 
open stand to require fundamental fairness in due process 
questions to problems which had earlier been considered to 
be settled. In fact, fundamental fairness requires a closer 
look by the courts at prior practices and legislation than 
the court was wont to do in the latter 1800's and early 
1900's. 
The situation in the present case is very similar 
to a conclusive presumption in favor of the railroad. The 
only time that conclusive presumptions are warranted is when 
they are based upon universally true facts. The idea that 
a misquotation of rates constitutes a secret rebate regardless 
of whether collusion exists or whether Union Pacific 
is negligent is akin to a conclusive presumption. Under the 
Fourteenth Amendment each case must stand or fall by itself/ 
because what might be fair under one situation may be grossly 
unfair under another. Thus to interpose the conclusive 
presumption that the railroad cannot be guilty of negligence 
or that a court awarded judgment is a secret rebate under the 
circumstances of this case amounts to an unreasonable result 
which has been prohibited in a number of cases including Heiner 
v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932) wherein the court stated as 
follows: 
A statute which imposes a tax upon an 
assumption of fact which the taxpayer is 
forbidden to controvert is so arbitrarily 
unreasonable that it cannot stand under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
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In the instant case where there is clearly no collusion 
and the carrier has the power to set the category, it is 
not simply a matter of picking the right rate but gives 
Union Pacific the power to select a rate of its own 
choosing. In addition, because the rate schedules of Union 
Pacific are so complicated and confusing that the ordinary 
person cannot be expected to determine the proper rate, the 
carrier is the only one who can determine the rate. 
The irrebuttable presumption applied by the trial 
court in the instant case is very similar to the conclusive 
presumption struck down in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 
(1973). In Vlandis the State of Connecticut had a statute 
concerned with residency requirements for state college 
tuition. Any unmarried students applying for admission to 
state colleges and universities would be permanently clas-
sified as non-residents for tuition purposes if their "legal 
address for any part of the one-year period immediately prior 
to application for admission" had been outside the state. 
Married students would be similarly classified if their 
"legal address at the time of . . . application" had been 
outside the state. The Supreme Court stated: 
. . . since Connecticut purports to be 
concerned with residency in allocating the 
rates for tuition and fees at its university 
system, it is forbidden by the Due Process 
Clause to deny any individual the resident 
rates on the basis of a permanent and ir-
rebuttable presumption of nonresidence, when 
that presumption is not necessarily or 
universally true in fact . . . 
Id., at 452. 
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The Connecticut statute contained no language 
imposing a presumption, either irrebuttable or otherwise. 
But the real interest of the state was in apportioning fees 
on the basis of bona fide residency, so that the Court held 
that a provision of law barring an inquiry into the question 
of bona fide residency must be based upon an underlying 
governmental objective which is necessarily or universally true. 
Applying this test to the instant case, the real 
interest of the legislation is to prevent secret rebates and 
anticompetitive acts on the part of the carriers in collusion 
with large shippers. However, the courts have forbidden an 
inquiry into the intent or acts of carriers and shippers based 
upon a conclusive presumption that is not "necessarily or 
universally true in fact." This presumption not only violates 
the reasonableness standard imposed by substantive due process, 
but also violates the fundamental principle that defendant 
Murray Elevators is entitled to have the question of negligence 
determined. 
The manifest unfairness in this case is shown by 
the following: 
1. Union Pacific originally quoted the following 
rates and amounts to defendant, who bid for a contract based 
on those rates and amounts. Union Pacific billed defendant 
for those rates and amounts and defendant paid the amounts in 
full prior to any "correction" notices: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Ref. In 
Record 
R-138 
R-139 
R-140 
R-141 
R-142 
R-143 
R-144 
R-145, 
122 
Date of 
Shipment 
4/1/73 
4/13/73 
5/21/73 
6/3/73 
7/21/73 
7/29/73 
9/22/73 
9/21/73 
Number 
PO7062 
P07333 
P08239 
P08427 
PO9308 
P09569 
P10472 
P16154 
Car 
Number 
UP499388 
UP508314 
UP500792 
UP497585 
UP500160 
UP490192 
UP507391 
UP507314 
Total 
Amount 
$1625.39 
1386.53 
1635.00 
1635.00 
1734.68 
1482.00 
1482.00 
2036.16 
Rate 
2.66 
2.64 
2.18 
2.18 
2.29 
2.47 
2.47 
3.20 
Weight 
(lbs.) 
61,105 
52,520 
74,740 
73,730 
75,750 
57,570 
60,000 
63,630 
TOTAL amount paid to Union Pacific—$13,016.76 
i 
2. Union Pacific next sent to defendant correction 
notices over a year after the shipments had been made and paid 
for by defendant alleging the following rates to be correct 
on the above shipments: 
Reference 
In Record 
R-134 
R-135 
R-137 
R-137 
R-137 
R-137 
R-137 
R-145 
Car 
Number 
UP499388 
UP508314 
UP500792 
UP497585 
UP500160 
UP490192 
UP507391 
UP507314 
Original 
Rate 
2.66 
2.64 
2.18 
2.18 
2.29 
2.47 
2.47 
3.20 
Corrected 
Rate 
2.735 
3.025 
2.53 
2.53 
2.68 
2.84 
2.84 
3.30 
Amount 
Due 
$ 45.83 
202.20 
262.50 
262.50 
295.42 
222.00 
222.00 
64.62 
TOTAL amount claimed as undercharges by Union Pacific—$1,577.07 
3. After this action was commenced the affidavit 
of Mr. Barker for Union Pacific, R-32, claims that a third set 
of rates were the true corrected rates for the shipments for 
Union Pacific and that the total amount due is $1,856.85 and not 
as stated in the original quote or first correction notices. 
The third set of "correct" rates are: 
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Bid 
Rate 
2.66 
2.64 
2.18 
2.18 
2.29 
2.47 
2.47 
3.20 
First 
Corrected 
Rate 
2.735 
3.025 
2.53 
2.53 
2.68 
2.84 
2.84 
3.30 
Second 
Corrected 
Rate 
2.78 
3.07 
2.61 
2.61 
2.74 
2.92 
2.92 
3.25 
Car 
Number 
UP499388 
UP508314 
UP500792 
UP497585 
UP500160 
UP490192 
UP507391 
UP507314 
Corrected 
Amount 
Due 
$ 73.33 
225.83 
322.50 
322.50 
340.87 
270.00 
270.00 
31.82 
TOTAL amount claimed due by Union Pacific—$1,856.85 
4. In addition to the above tables, showing 
various rates determined by Union Pacific to be the "correct" 
rate for the eight shipments, Answers to Interrogatories 
filed by Union Pacific, Record Page 89, states that there is 
still a possible correction to be made as follows: 
As a matter of further information, you 
will note that the shipments referred to 
in Interrogatories No. 2(c), No. 5, No. 6(a), 
(b) and (c), and No. 7(a) and (b) were assessed 
charges lower than the legal published rates 
at the times of shipments. Corrections as 
to these shipments will be made shortly and 
balance due bills will be issued to you in 
order to comply with Part 1, Section 6(7) 
of the Interstate Commerce Act. 
Murray Elevators was unable to ascertain what the ap-
plicable rates were for these shipments when it examined the 
Union Pacific rate schedules. It is apparent that Union 
Pacific itself still does not know what the proper rates for 
these shipments should be. The confusion manifest in this 
record cannot support the trial court's summary judgment based 
on the fiction that the shipper is conclusively presumed to 
know the correct rates. This court should determine that due 
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process requires that the court resolve the issue of collusion 
and reject the presumption which absolves a carrier from its own 
negligence. 
£ 0 N C L U £ > . I 0 N 
The denial of Murray Elevators1 right to assert the 
negligence of Union Pacific raises squarely the matter of 
substantive fairness. The rule applied by the trial court 
is no longer a viable or justifiable rule of law and should be 
narrowed to include only those acts fairly within the intent of 
the Interstate Commerce Act as it pertains to collusive rebates. 
Shippers using the facilities of railroad carriers should be 
able to rely upon the rates quoted by the carriers so long as 
such quotations are made in good faith and received in good 
faith. To hold shippers to the unintelligible rate schedules 
appearing in the record of this case by the use of an extreme 
presumption that the shipper knows the rates and categories 
is a fundamental unfairness which should be corrected by this 
Court. 
DATED this day of February, 1976. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Walter P. Faber, Jr. 
David Lloyd 
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